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According to Jhering, the real force which moves man to action is
interest. To him, action without interest is an absurdity because it is
not practical. If law in general is human reason, as Montesquieu has
said, quite clearly within the scope of reason is to be found a great
diversity of conditions which impinge upon human life. The realm of
law and the potential realm of reason cannot be coextensive. Reason
and the materials of human existence upon which reason operates are
easily distinguishable entities. As a social asset, pure reason would seem
to have currency only in such rarified spheres as mathematics. The
practical men of law have long since endorsed the position of Jhering
who was unable to understand how pure reason, unsupported by some
vital force, could be practical in delineating the field of human activity.
Only the legally protected interests in any culture define the sphere of
existing law.
When sociology awakened men to an awareness of the vital factors
which condition life, the formal bounds of legal science were disrupted
and legal problems were no longer restricted to the sterile dialectic
process. When the concept of interests stirred the imaginations of men
to the realities of living, the law passed into its modern phase of development. The conscious goal of human progress became the end of the
law. The luring past became only a lingering memory except in so far
as the history of its legal development yielded concepts, methods and
ideals either as a warning against the dangers of conformity or as a
challenge to the creative requirements of cultural growth.
During the past generation there clearly has been a mounting interest
in the problem of legal method. The recent publication of The Jurisprudence of Interests' in the 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series is
illustrative of the progress in legal theory since the turn of the century.
In his Survey of Social Interests, Roscoe Pound has aptly noted the new
viewpoint:
"There has been a notable shift throughout the world from
thinking of the task of the legal order as one of adjusting the exer1 This little volume embodies the selected writings of six German scholars: Riimelin,
Heck, Oertmann, Stoll, Binder and Isay. These selected writings were translated and
edited by" M. Magdalena Schoch. The book was published by Harvard University Press.
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cise of free wills to one of satisfying wants, of which free exercise
of the will is but one. Accordingly, we must start today from a
theory of interests, that is, of the claims or demands or desires
which human beings, either individually or in groups or associations
or relations, seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, the adjustment of
relations and ordering of conduct through the force of politically
organized society must take account. .

.

. It is enough to say here

that the classification into individual interests, public interests, and
social interests was suggested by Jhering."2
The Historical School had little to say, according to Riimelin, on
how legal precepts have their origin in the needs of practical life or
how practical life is affected by them. The student was guided to thinking in those terms only when he turned to the writings of Jhering. The
Jurisprudence of Interests not only accentuated the importance of comparative law, but it gave meaning to the constellations of interests which
evolved in the life of society. Indeed, it led to a unification of the social
sciences. Factual research then became a necessity and Sociological
Jurisprudence appeared upon the juristic horizon.
The alleged critical study by Isay of The Method of the Jurisprudence
of Interests seems to be more amazing than it is illuminating. Fuller
briefly characterizes the defects of his performance as follows:
"According to Isay, the Jurisprudence of Interests suffers chiefly
from the fact that it accepts the traditional but untenable notion
that the decision of cases is derived from rules. In fact, rules are a
rationalization after the event. Isay sees the Jurisprudence of
Interests as a quixotic attempt to reduce to rational terms ethical
values that can only be felt, but not reasoned about." 4
Let us examine a few excerpts which reveal the character of Isay's
critical study. Some of these passages, which epitomize the issues, are
apt to impress the reader as a baffling bit of dialectics.
Color vs. Content
"In the first place, the nction of 'interest' is too colorless and
therefore almost devoid of content. It does not become clearer by
being defined as man's 'desire for the goods of life.' "
So declares Isay.
To declare that any concept which is colorless is therefore devoid
of content is difficult to justify. The rationalism, of either Kant or
2 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1943).
3 THE J RiSpRUDENCE or INTERESTS -4 (1948)
4 Id. at xxiv.

5 Id. at 316.
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Hegel, clearly had a content, yet the world has probably never discovered that either genius ever endowed rationalism with a particularly
colorful quality. The content of a right6 or a duty, of a power or a
liability, or of any concept, is not dependent on the character of its
colorfulness. If it were, virtue as a concept would be thrillingly
iridescent. Whether an interest has an opalescent appeal depends largely upon the interest. The content of a concept depends upon its substance. Color is only a descriptive incident which might be significant
to identify it, if not to appraise it. With conspicuous clarity, Stoll
declares that legal concepts are "shorthand expressions for determined
interest-situations and for evaluations of these situations." 7 Winfield
says that many questions of public policy are uninteresting to the whole
community.' Yet any specific question may present a vivid conflict
of interests.
In the Mogul Steamship Co. case,9 one of England's famous tea cases,
the question of cheaper tea was presented, entangled in the issue of
restraint of trade. The plaintiff was threatened with the certain ruin
of his business by his defendant-competitors, who were cutting freight
rates in the China tea carrying trade, if their conduct were not declared tortious by the court. The interest of the plaintiff found concrete
embodiment in the controversy as did the interest of his competitors,
and incidentally the-interest of the British public in cheaper tea. In
resolving the conflict of interests in the action, some of the judges
refused to recognize that a combination in restraint of trade would give
to the plaintiff any right of action against the defendants on the basis
of public policy. What is public policy? It is a highly faceted concept.
Upon occasion it is as variable in color as the chameleon. Why? Because it is dependent upon the diverse contexts in which a conflict may
arise within any constellation of interests. The number of constellations
and their complexity is limited only by the range of a given culture
in a specific time and place.
The fallacy of Isay's approach was envisioned and clarified by an
acute observation of Roscoe Pound. The flexibility of his three-fold
classification of interest may require that one's purpose should direct
one's viewpoint in weighing the various types of claims or demands.
Indeed, the progress of all science is promoted by the expert who knows
when and how to ask the proper question.
6 As Roscoe Pound says the term "right" is a word of many meanings. Pound, A Survey
REV. 1, 3 (1943).
7 TnE JURISPRUDENCE O INTERESTS 260 (1948).
8 Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HAgv. L. REv. 76, 92 (1928).
9 Mogul Steamship Co., Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., E1892J A. C. 25.

of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L.
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"For some purposes and in some connections it is convenient to
look at a given claim or demand or desire from one standpoint.
For other purposes or in other connections it is convenient to look
at the same claim or demand or the same type of claims or demands from one of the other standpoints. When it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands with respect to other claims or
demands, we must be careful to compare them on the same plane.
If we put one as an individual interest and the other as a social
interest we may decide the question in advance in our very way of
putting it. For example . . . one may think of the claim of the
employer to make contracts freely as an individual interest of substance. In that event, we must weigh it with the claim of the employee not to be coerced by economic pressure into making contracts
to take his pay in orders on a company store, thought of as an individual interest of personality. If we think of either in terms of a
policy we must think of the other in the same terms."' 10
According to Pound, the competing interests must be adequately
aligned to be properly valued. It was only because of the great emphasis which was placed upon individual interests during the last century that no fruitful development of the content of the concept "public
policy" was achieved.
The Theory of Value
Since Heck considers that the Jurisprudence of Interests is "a method
of legal science and hence of rational thought," Isay asks: "What is
the rational proceeding by which the Jurisprudence of Interests establishes the content of a legal norm sought?" only to learn, quite discontentedly, that the answer, which all the adherents of Heck's school
have given, is highly inadequate. The answer is that the jurists and
judges should evaluate and balance the interests involved." Isay is
skeptical.
"For by telling the legislator or the judge that he must adjust
those interests, we have told him nothing whatever about the content of the rule which is to be the legal norm. A method ought to
give the legislator or the judge at least some directive as the viewpoints by which he should make the evaluation, and the standards
by which he should weigh the interests thus evaluated. . . . Heck
stresses the necessity of a 'value-research' and of a 'theory of values'
-but he assigns this 'difficult task' to legal philosophy, which he
regards as a pre-science in relation to legal science. He considers
this function outside the pale of the Jurisprudence of Interests.
'The Jurisprudence of Interests is not a theory of substantive
values.'
10 Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. Rlv. 1, 2 (1943).
11 THE JuRISP uDEN CE O

INTERESTS

315 (1948).
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"This shows clearly that the Jurisprudence of Interests today
does not yet have a 'method' for establishing the content of legal
rules, and that, if it persists in its refusal to inquire into values and
-as must be added-to elaborate standards for weighing values,
it will never have such a method." 2
Nothing would seem more clear than that the competing interests
and their evaluations do depend upon the end of the law which is dictated by its purpose. The method by which the means to an end is
achieved is a rational process. As Oertmann points out, the concept of
interest is an expansive one. The ideal interests of morality as well as
the utilitarian interests of the market place may be at stake. The death
penalty in criminal law and the complex problems of sex in the question
of divorce do raise disconcerting, if not baffling, issues of evaluations. 3
Whence comes this necessity of Heck for assigning the difficult task of
evaluation to philosophy, the handmaiden of legal science? "Methodolatry" may have been the conditioning factor of Isay's criticism.
If one concedes that a value is a qualitative content of the apprehending process, 4 for any legal scientist to insist upon a formulation of a
scale of values to complete the legal system is naive. Certainly, as yet,
in the science of axiology no specific scale of values has ever been
achieved, if indeed any is possible within the realm of human attainment. In his evasive reply to his critics, Heck says,
"True, we have not produced such a scale of values nor am I
going to present one. The reason is simply that we do not aspire
to such lofty aims. All we want to accomplish is to aid judges."' 5
Since the supremacy of its value dominates all other attributes of
an interest in any given situation, candor seems to have required a more
pertinent reply. Since the days of Plato, in the world of ideas, the
question of value has been one of the most difficult, of all science. It
is a basic question.
One may agree with Heck that "The Jurisprudence of Interests is
not a theory of substantive values."' 6 The theory of value merely conditions the Jurisprudence of Interests. And one may be inclined to
agree with Isay that "A 'rational' theory of evaluation is an impossibility," if emotion is'
eliminated from the law-finding process. Yet, it
would seem that his pronouncement grievously lacks insight. Who would
12
13

Id. at 317.
Id. at 75.

14 R m, A MEORY OF VALuE 42 (1938).
15 THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTmREsTs 31 (1948).
16 Id. at 317.
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say that psychiatry, which deals with materials of emotional creation,
is not a rational science? When Heck stated that the function of a
judge was to collaborate in the realization of recognized ideals within
a given legal order, he had an objective approach. His declaration
merely implied that in any action, a conflict of interests presupposes
that, within a given culture, there are recognized ideals. Their preexistence is assumed in the established legal order. Law may signify
the "body of authoritative materials of or grounds of or guides to
determination, whether judicial or administrative.'"' The question of
the basis of the theory of value of those ideals is quite distinct from
the actual existence of conflicting interests. The theory of value of
the recognized ideals conditions the interests involved; all interests are
not legally protected. Very properly Heck consigned the task of evaluation of those ideals to philosophy.
Kohler says that the Philosophy of Law seeks for the deeper significance of man's activity. To man has been given the task of creating
and developing a culture to obtain permanent culture values.' 8 The
objective reality given to interest values in a specific culture may greatly
aid in giving tangibility to this subtle and perplexing problem. If value
is conceived as a logically primitive concept, then Isay's desire to have
the Jurisprudence of Interests give a specific value content to a legal
norm would seem to be mere fantasy. But if value is merely a function
of a coherent organization of the experience of men, then how their
interests gain recognition is easily exemplified. For value is the object
of all our interests and the content of all our ideals, 9 despite the fact
that it easily eludes definition and is relative to the specific context in
which it plays a dominant role.
The Realistic Theory
In the same year that Isay's Critical Study appeared, Roscoe Pound
was asking these pertinent questions. Are received ideals a part of the
law? Shall we say that they are wholly outside the law? Or, are they
a part of generally recognized materials of law? The fruitful answers
to these questions may be found in A Comparison of Ideals of Law.2"
Pound so realistically fortifies his exposition that the dialectic fog seems
to vanish. What Isay said was impossible becomes a confirmed reality.
What is the relation of morality to the legal order? Let Pound present
his perspective of the problem of evolving values in law.
17 Pound, What Is Law?, 47 W. VA. L.
18 BlYcK, PmLosoHy or LAW 4 (1921).

Q.

1, 4 (1940).

'9 REm, A THEoRY oF VALE 295 (1938).
20 Pound, A Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1933).
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"We soon find ourselves compelled to take account of certain
ideals of what those authoritative materials should be and how
they should be understood and applied in order to achieve the ends
of the legal order and of the judicial process....
"Such ideals may be held and made the background of their decisions by judges unconsciously or, one might say, half consciously.
Often they have a traditional authority from having been received
in the thinking and understanding of practitioners and judges-an
authority therefore quite as legitimate as that of traditionally
received precepts. Often they have been assumed in a long course
of teaching and writing so that lawyers and judges, perhaps for
generations, have assumed them as a matter of course as the criteria
of valuing claims, deciding upon the intrinsic merit of competing
interpretations, choosing from among possible starting points of
legal reasoning or competing analogies, and determining what is
reasonable and just. Sometimes we may find this body of received
ideals referred to in the lists of subsidia in the codes or in authoritative or semi-authoritative expositions of the codes."'"
A rational theory of value is found to impregnate law, infected with
those irrational factors of emotion which make life vibrant with human
interests. When one deserts the realm of life in the abstract and deals
with the life of men in the concrete, competing interests strive for recognition. If history supplies the facts and the phases of the evolution of
law, its cultural antecedents and their consequences, out of which law
has emerged, it would seem that the humanism of our century has
sufficiently sensitized our legal philosophy to the well-being of men so
that it can evaluate with discrimination which of the competing interests shall be protected by law.
The Living Law
According to Heck,
"It is preeminently through judicial decisions that law affects
human affairs. Not until the law has been embodied in judicial decision does it become a living reality." 2
If so, of necessity, the burden rests upon the lawyer to learn to understand the method employed by the judge in his decision. A generation
ago, in the United States, some lawyers became fully aware of the
functioning of the judicial process when the courts were considered
merely as a formidable obstacle to be overcome in order to free the
public from the domination of property interests. The problem was
to remove the dead hand of precedent and to inculcate in the judiciary
21 Id. at 2.
22 ME JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS 37 (1948).
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the spirit of the age. As a bulwark of special privilege, the "technicality-ridden" judges were declared a judicial oligarchy.'
Heck's main objection to the orthodox dogma of cognition was that
the judge performed an abstract function of reckoning only with concepts and subsuming the pertinent facts under the rules by an objective
process of logic. The judge was not concerned with the effect of his
decision on human affairs. The judge felt no necessity to justify the
result of his decision, having adhered to the conventional technique.
The two insights24 which, according to Heck, serve as guides to Jurisprudence of Interests are:
1. The judge is bound by law. He shall adjust interests; in case
of a conflict of interests, he shall evaluate them in the same way as the
legislator.
2. Since the laws are often inadequate, and sometimes contradictory,
due to the variety of the problems which arise in actual life, the judge
is not expected to obey the law literally. He must evaluate the interests
involved when the laws are silent; he must frame new rules and correct
the established ones when the rules are deficient.
According to Cardozo, nine-tenths, and perhaps more, of the cases
which come before the court are predetermined.25 There is never complete freedom in the judicial process. The court is encompassed by
statutes and their implications, by precedents and by the shadowy traditions of the past and its long established techniques. The limits of
judicial freedom, Cardozo regarded as very narrow.- The court may
neither nullify nor pervert a statute because it does not believe in the
values it reflects. It must be guided by objective values rather than by
subjective ones. Cardozo endorsed the method proposed by Duguit 6
to resolve this judicial problem. Resort should be had to the aggregate
social facts which produced the "juridical norm." What shall be the
resort of the distracted judge when authority is silent? In the absence
of the fortunate finding of a decision on all fours, the search may yield
remote competing analogies. The conscious implications of this process
Cardozo revealed to be the function of philosophy." Pertinent to this
issue, Heck cites the famous article of the Swiss Civil Code of 1907.1
It affords a statutory basis for greater judicial freedom, which, in sub23 ROE, OuR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY (1912).
24 THE JuRISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS 40 (1948).
25 CARDOZo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924)

26 Id. at 96.
27 Id. at 98-99.
28 THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS 41 n.

18 (1948).
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stance, he believes is valid for the German judge as well as the Swiss
judge.
"The Law must be applied in all cases which come within the
letter or the spirit of any of its provisions.
"Where no provision is applicable, the judge shall decide according to the existing Customary Law and, in default thereof, according
to the rule which he would lay down if he had himself to act as
legislator.
"Herein he must be guided by approved legal doctrine and caselaw."
In referring to the divergent conceptions of the judicial office now
taken by the members of our Supreme Court, Fuller says that these
differences are not to be found in their economic and political views
but rather "in divergent conceptions of the ways in which men should
be governed, in opposing views of the judge's office and of his relation
to statutes, and even in epistomological differences about the respective
roles of reason and intuition in the ordering of human affairs."2 9 If
one were to epitomize Fuller's analysis of these diversities in the judicial
approach, perhaps the simplest resort would lie in Cardozo's classic
belief that the most important qualification of a judge is his philosophy.
Probably, Cardozo would have accepted Whitehead's view that
"Philosophy is an attitude of mind toward doctrines ignorantly entertained."30
Conceptualistic Quibbling
Binder laments that the jurisprudence of the nineteenth century failed
to keep its eyes on the practical. viewpoint which guided Savigny.31
Had practical appropriateness, instead of formal validity, been its guide,
it would not have flung itself into the arms of formal logic and indulged
in "fatuous conceptualistic quibblings." "A jurisprudence of concepts
which had properly understood itself would certainly not have met with
that fate." The vast amount of legal material to be unified and simplified made conceptualism a necessity. But long prior to the turn of the
century, legal science complacently pursued its accustomed paths, undisturbed by any suggestion to remedy its apparent defects.3 2 Even the
uncritical credulity of Jhering's adherents, due to their partisanship,
flaunted catchwords like "conceptualistic jurisprudence" with little
awareness that they were quite devoid of concrete meaning. To Binder,
this was astonishing.
29 Id. at xvii.
30 WmTEnEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT 233 (1938).
31 THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS 287 (1948).
32 Id. at 279.
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When Jhering emphasized the term "legal construction" as "among
the most usual terms of art" in modern jurisprudence, Binder thought
that legal science should have inquired into the origin of the term in
order to ascertain the legal nature of a concept as concept "since all
sciences, past and present, form and utilize concepts." The art of formulating concepts seems to consist of construing the simple principles of
a statute in order to discover their "hidden riches." Through their interpretation there may be "created the multifariousness of the law." The
function of modern legal science obtains its results "by freely developing
concepts." To legal theory is assigned the practical function of distilling
out of an abundant source material a practical concept, as did the
Historical School. 3
What were the revolutionary germs which brought to fine fruition the
German Civil Code?34 The struggle between the old and the new jurisprudence centered about the problem of gaps in the law. How were they
to be filled? The dogma of the logical completeness of the law did not
supply the answer. The dream of formal logic was to elevate the law
to the rank of a science by a process of mathematical thinking. The
dream was shattered by the shortcomings of its technique. Due to the
aberrations of its conceptual approach, its method of construction was
branded a "method of inversion."
The Problem of Construction
Stoll asks: Is it possible for a legislator or a scholar to form concepts
and build a system? That aim cannot be achieved arbitrarily; the goal
must be determined by teleological considerations. 5 "A statute or a
code is more than a sum of legal rules," 3 6 since objective unity is a dominant consideration. The task of interpretation is to achieve a systematic
development of the basic ideas which it formulated. A Jurisprudence
of Interests adopts a method of interpretation in aid of the established
system and repudiates the establishing of a "theoretical system" by
a logical process of expansion. The avowed split between logic and legal
science is unmistakable. The clear cleavage supplies this explicit admonition: "TIhe formal-logical system does not yield legal rules for a teleological order." "The legislator is not a fanatic of logic."37 The law is
to be applied in accordance with facts in the light of its purpose.
33

Id. at 284.

34 Id. at 290.

-5 Id. at 259.
-3 Id. at 263.
37 Id. at 264.
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The life of a concept depends, not upon the volition of a legislator,
but on an evaluating thought. The social condition which dictated the
legal relationship determines the content of the notion. The problem
of construction is basically one of interest-analysis. The method of
logic is convincingly appealed to when the issue of equivocation is
presented by a choice between different results. Then arise the resolving
considerations of utility. The evaluations of the interests reflect their
protective origin, i.e., legal rules and command concepts3 8
The formulation of concepts, according to Heck, is primarily a process
of giving a name to an idea. 9 However closely related a concept and
its name may be, the fallacy is apparent; a concept is not merely a word.
The dual task of the legislator is to correlate the concepts of the law
with the concept of human relations. That is the problem of realism.
Herein lies the dual possibility that he may*err. Schifeld's observation
is in point.
"A scientific concept which does not rest upon the objectivity of
actual facts is a non-concept which has no truth and no reality."40
What is the meaning which Stoll assigns to construction? To synthesize he adopts the definition of Riimelin and Heck. Construction is
merely that "logical operation with concepts, whose practical aim is to
complement the operation of subsumption, and whose theoretical aim
is to complete the theoretical system and to prove its unityY41 To
construe a factual situation in order to supplement its subsumption is
the immemorial method of judge and lawyers, firmly entrenched in
current legal thinking. The function of scholarly research according
to Stoll is to translate the rules enacted by the legislature in terms of
concepts. "The rules themselves indicate the decisive characteristics
of these concepts." 42
Conclusion
These collected essays, subsumed under the title of The Jurisprudence
of Interests, will have a strong appeal to those of the legal profession,
who have become conversant with the basic materials through the extensive writings and the stimulating teaching of Roscoe Pound. Their
critical approaches frequently provide an inciting zest. Occasionally,
the controversial differences may seem to call into play the dogmatic
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
42 Id. at

266.
267.
271.
272.
270.
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ego of the essayist. Of necessity the issues involved not infrequently
wing their way into the realm of the abstract. Fuller commends this
book especially to the student who wishes to understand the civil law,
although it offers no systematic statement of German law." His commendation is based on the common conviction that the great need of a
student who approaches a foreign system is not a knowledge of its rules
but of its methods.
43 Id. at xxiv-xxv.

